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INTRODUCTION

Public choice theorists have focused upon the reasons for excessive
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governmental output, i.e. for greater than optimal regulation by administrative agencies.' A parallel, but largely unexamined phenomenon of recent decades has been the oversupply of regulatory reform.
While individual instances of regulatory reform have been the subject
of study, commentators have not examined the extent and overlapping
reach of all the numerous requirements imposed upon administrative
agencies. Whatever the changes wrought by specific instances of reform, the entire package, at least if taken seriously by administrative
agencies, substantially changes the nature of administrative
rulemaking.
In urging regulatory reform, politicians have shared the view of
theorists that government agencies have overregulated. In February
1981, President Ronald Reagan promulgated his now famous Executive Order 12291 requiring federal agencies to engage in a formal analysis to determine that the potential benefits to society of any proposed
rulemaking outweigh the potential costs to society that the proposed
action would impose. 2 In describing the reasons for Executive Order
12291, President Reagan said:
American society experienced a virtual explosion in government regulation during the past decade. Between 1970 and 1979, expenditures for the major regulatory agencies quadrupled. The number of pages published annually
in the FederalRegister nearly tripled, and the number of pages in the Code of
Federal Regulations increased by nearly two-thirds. The result has been
higher prices, higher unemployment, and lower productivity growth. Overregulation causes small and independent business men and women, as well as
large businesses, to defer or terminate plans for expansion. And since they're
3
responsible for most of the new jobs, those new jobs just aren't created.

Administrative agencies have always enjoyed a peculiar position in
the American governmental structure. Formally lodged in the executive branch, agencies have also been delegated roles that are legislative and judicial in nature.4 Whatever their roles, however,
traditionally agencies have been viewed as operating under a system of
law. When in an article written some years ago, Professor Richard
Stewart stated that "[i]ncreasingly, the function of administrative law
is... the provision of a surrogate political process to ensure the fair
representation of a wide range of affected interests in the process of
administrative decision,"5 he still envisioned that surrogate process as
operating within the framework of a previously-determined political
1. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 247-73 (1989).

2. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601
(West Supp. 1992).
3. Program for Economic Recovery, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress,
PUB. PAPERs 108, 113 (Feb. 18, 1981).
4. See BERNARD ScHwARTz, ADmNISTRATivE LAw 4-7 (2d ed. 1984).
5. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (1975).

1992]

ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING

1171

consensus that had been embodied, albeit vaguely, into a statutory
enactment.
In recent years, critical legal studies theorists have made us acutely
aware of the distinction between law and politics.6 Central to the rule

of law is the notion that authority be exercised only according to previously declared general rules.7 These general rules rarely, if ever,
partake of the majestic neutral formalism with which legal theorists
once imbued them. Statutory law, especially, is the product of roughand-tumble political compromise. The results of this compromise,
however, are generally recognized as legitimate in our system because
those engaged in the fray are actors who have been democratically
elected, and they play by pre-determined rules.8 When sufficient compromise or concession has been obtained to achieve a pre-determined
vote by Congress and when the President is in sufficient agreement to
acquiesce in the compromise, political position has been crystallized
into federal law.
Administrative agencies have traditionally posed a challenge to the
notion of the rule of law because of the extensive discretion, and vague
direction, often given to non-elected administrators. 9 A renewed interest in constitutional limitations upon legislative delegation of authority has grown up around this problem.10 The more recent spate of
regulatory reform, however, is largely unconcerned with applying the
rule of law to limit agency discretion. Rather, it is primarily concerned with interposing values outside those embodied in the original
mandate of the agency and introducing perspectives from outside the
traditional administrative process. The new reforms, while operating
under the guise of legal rules, are in fact largely attempts at political
control of administrative rulemaking.
II.

THE STRANDS OF MODERN REGULATORY REFORM

Regulatory statutes are vast in number and cover enormously varied subject matters. Indeed, their only common denominator is the
delegation by Congress of initial administration, interpretation and
enforcement primarily to executive branch personnel in specialized
departments and agencies. A large part of the regulatory reform un6. See Roberto M. Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REV.
561 (1983).
7. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 209-14 (rev. ed. 1969).
8. See generally, STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION To LAW AND LEGAL REA-

SONING 167-85 (1985).
9. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
10. See e.g., Symposium, The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative
Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1987); David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance? 83 MIca. L. REV. 1223 (1985); Peter H.
Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982).

1172

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1169

dertaken in recent years has been its attempt to impose across-theboard procedural or substantive requirements on all regulatory activity. Rather than focusing on individual regulatory structures, these
initiatives have attempted, as did the Administrative Procedure Act1l
in 1946, to impose a uniform group of requirements on vastly different
regulatory regimes.
The Administrative Procedure Act, however, attempted to create
procedures to permit agencies to operate within their previously articulated legal mandate. The hallmark of the new era of regulatory
reform is that procedures are created to bypass the original political
consensus. It is interesting to note that those proposing regulatory reform, both before and after Reagan, generally did not accuse administrative agencies of straying from their original mandate. Rather they
have argued that the costs imposed by regulation have been ignored2
and that society-wide countervailing values, such as those of economic
growth, economic stability, and full employment should take precedence over the narrower health, safety or welfare goals of particular
agencies.1S It is this which impels much of modern administrative reform to be structural in nature.
In enacting a particular regulatory statute, Congress has not only
created a regulatory structure, but has generally chosen with some
care the agency or department in which to lodge responsibility for administration of the statute.14 It is no accident that enforcement of provisions relating to worker safety was lodged in OSHA and not in the
Small Business Administration or in the Department of Commerce.
Nor is it chance that the responsibility for environmental protection
was lodged in the EPA and not in the Department of the Interior.
Recent literature has suggested that the original understanding of
Congress can be preserved not only by specific delegations of authority, but also, and perhaps as importantly, by the design of the particular administrative agency which is created to implement a newly
enacted regulatory structure. 15 Thus, allegiance to the original political compromise that was crystallized into law involves more than allegiance to specifically mandated results. It also involves the lodging
of discretion in the decisionmaking body to which it was originally
11. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1988 & West Supp. 1992).
12. See, e.g., Marvin H. Kosters, Counting the Costs, July/Aug. 1979 REGULATION 17.
13. See GEORGE C. EADs & MICHAEL Fix, RELIEF OR REFORM? REAGAN'S REGULATORY DiLEmMA 17-44 (1984).

14. See Government Operations:D.C.BarPanel DebatesLegitimacy of Quayle Council Regulatory Reviews, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA)(Feb. 25, 1992): "The
president appoints the heads of agencies and of the Cabinet departments with the
consent of Congress. But the laws that Congress writes delegates the authority to
make decisions to those individuals, not to the president."
15. See Jonathan R. Macey, OrganizationalDesign and PoliticalControlof Administrative Agencies, 8 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992).
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delegated.' 6
Agencies tend to become partisans for the regulatory goal they
were created to implement.i7 When new regulatory statutes are enacted, it becomes important to choose carefully the agency or department that will assume responsibility for them. A particular agency
becomes a lobbyist for the interests it is charged with protecting. Its
top officials inevitably assume a role consistent with the purposes of
the agency, driven in that direction by a non-partisan civil service
dedicated to the goals of the agency. Once we understand that the
rule of law includes both the mandated goal and the specified decision
maker, we can then see that tinkering with either undercuts the rule
of law. Changing the decision maker can create political interference
with the rule of law just as directly as can interference with the delegated goals of an agency. Many of the modern attempts at regulatory
reform are political in the sense that they attempt to introduce both
new values and new participants into the rulemaking process, often
without achieving sufficient political consensus to enact new legislation. Even where the reforms are legislative in nature, many of them
have avoided reaching any new consensus on a particular regulatory
structure. Rather new goals are articulated only in the abstract and
their relationship to existing agency mandates are left deliberately
vague.
By the 1980s, a broad consensus had developed regarding the use of
market based strategies in economic regulation.iS No comparable consensus existed, however, regarding social regulation.19 Each regulatory statute was originally enacted only after a broad agreement had
developed regarding the inadequacy of an unregulated regime to
achieve important policy goals. 20 Whether the concern was environmental pollution, workplace safety, product safety, or a variety of
other perceived evils, a politically acceptable regulatory approach ultimately developed. However, over time, new or changing values are
often perceived. How and to what extent can and should those new or
changing priorities be introduced into pre-existing regulatory
2
structures? '
16. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process,Politicsand Policy:AdministrativeArrangements and the PoliticalControl of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV.
431 (1989).
17. See Daniel F. Spulber & David Besanko, Delegation,Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate, 8 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 126, 133-40 (1992).
18. See, EADS & Fix, supra note 13 at 69-80 (1984).
19. Id at 80-85.
20. See James G. Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct PopularPower in
the American Constitutional Order,139 U. PA. L. REv. 287 (1990).
21. See Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on "Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies" Administrative Process
and OrganizationalForm as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L.
REV. 499, 501-04 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, supra note 15 at 98-99; Kenneth A.
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The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 created a rather
straightforward method for administrative agencies to consider conflicting interests and values. Public notice of a proposed rule was to be
given, and those interested were allowed an opportunity to submit
comments.22 This procedure assumed confidence in the administrative agency to adequately consider and weigh comments and objections, and assumed that the comment procedure would produce for the
agency the relevant competing viewpoints. Modern regulatory reform
results from the breakdown of these assumptions. Both Congress and
the President have superimposed new layers of procedure on top of
the original Administrative Procedure Act. These new requirements
reflect increasing frustration with the regulatory process, as they require more and more explicit consideration of competing interests
which one might suppose would have been exposed through existing
procedures. Thus explicit requirements to consider environmental
impact, the impact of regulation on small business, family values, federalism issues, and protection of private property emerged. Also, procedures to stimulate more and earlier comment on rulemaking
alternatives by affected groups were instituted. In a final act of
desperation, a regulatory moratorium was imposed on most new
rulemaking that was perceived by the White House to be impeding
economic growth. These procedures all tend to operate outside of the
original political consensus embodied into regulatory statutes. In essence they permit shifting priorities to be imposed in place of the ones
embodied in authorizing legislation.23
Together, then, a crazy-quilt pattern of directives has been given to
administrative agencies:
(1) Carry out the mandates of the original regulatory statutes
which were assigned to you.
(2) In furthering the goals originally assigned to your agency,
temper them by all costs that the imposition of those goals
would impose. Do this by drawing up an elaborate cost-benefit
analysis for each proposal.
(3) In addition to considering all costs and benefits, consider
specially a variety of other values or concerns.
(4) After you have done all of this, expose your conclusions to
public comment so that you can consider any costs or benefits
that you may have ignored.
(5) But before you do any of this, be certain to give certain
specified types of advance notice of what you plan to propose.
Shepsle, Comment, BureaucraticDrif4 CoalitionalDrif4 and Time Consistency:
A Comment on Macey, 8 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 111, 114-15 (1992).

22. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
23. Cf Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Proceduresas Instruments of
PoliticalControl, 3 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987).
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(6) But do not do any of this, at least for a time, unless an
emergency exists or your regulation will foster economic
growth.
One of the most commented-upon aspects of modern regulatory reform has been the centralization of White House control over the
rulemaking process. 24 This aspect of reform began early. President
Nixon 25 and President Ford26 both instituted programs for White
House review of proposed rules in light of then existing White House
priorities. This approach has not been limited to Republican or conservative administrations. President Carter perceived many of the
same problems and approached them in a similar fashion.27 The technique was refined under President Reagan and modified again under
President Bush.
These approaches take control from the agencies whose structures
often assure adherence to their original goals, 28 and shift them to
those who more directly share a "broader" vision. Particularly in periods in which different political parties control the White House and
Congress, this is the vision of a President alone. Thus began a number
of reforms which shifted control of much rulemaking from particular
agencies to the Office of Management and Budget,29 and then to the
Council on Competitiveness. 30
III. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: THE
UNLIKELY PARENT OF MODERN REFORM
The techniques of broad regulatory reform are often procedural in
nature. Instead of mandating particular results, administrative agen24. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, PresidentX and the New (Approved) Decisionmaking,
36 Am. U. L. REV.535 (1987).

25. Nixon's Quality of Life Review Process was established by memoranda issued by
the Office of Management and Budget. See, EADs & Fix, supra note 13 at 46-50.
26. See Exec. Order No. 11,8213 C.F.R. 926 (1971-75); Exec. Order No. 11,949, 3 C.F.R.

161 (1977).
27. See Exec. Order No. 12,044,3 C.F.R. 152 (1979). See also Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex ParteContacts by the White House, 80 COLUM.
L. REV.943 (1980).
28. See Macey, supra note 15; McCubbins, et al., supra note 16.
29. See generally, Allan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking:
The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV.L. Rxv. 1059 (1986); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 HAITRV. L. REV.1075 (1986); Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential
Control of Regulatory Decisionmaking,36 AM. U. L. REv. 443 (1987).
30. The Council on Competitiveness, formed by President Bush in April 1989, is
chaired by the Vice President, and includes as members the Attorney General,
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Secretary of
Commerce, and the Chief of Staff to the President. Briefing by Marlin Fitzwater,
April 4, 1989, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Federal News File.

1176

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1169

cies are required to institute a process that ensures consideration of
specific approaches or values. This technique originated in the National Environmental Protection Act as a means of protecting against
under-regulation. The Act requires that each agency, after consultation with the federal agencies having jurisdiction or special expertise
with respect to the environmental impact involved, prepare an environmental impact statement to accompany every major proposal that
is made which would significantly affect environmental quality.31 As
originally proposed, the establishment of a new executive branch
agency, the Council on Environmental Quality, was the primary focus
of NEPA. However, concern that such an agency would not receive
strong support from the White House led to the creation of a mechanism designed to force individual agencies to implement Congress' environmental policy on their own. Each agency would be required to
evaluate the impact of their proposals on the quality of the
32
environment.
Of course, mandating consideration of environmental concerns
does not guarantee that those concerns will prevail. 33 It does however
at least ensure that they will not be totally overlooked in a period of
resistance to environmental concerns.34 Mandated procedures serve
as something of a check upon underregulation. It is perhaps ironic
that this technique-the mandated preparation of impact statements-came to be used often in the 1980s and 1990s to combat overregulation. Indeed, much of the regulatory reform of the modern era
is primarily negative in nature. Unlike the National Environmental
Policy Act, the goal of later reforms has been to delay or prevent,
rather than spur, agency action.
IV. THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT OF 1980
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 was a reflection of the attitude of President Carter, as a small businessman and as a non-lawyer,
toward government regulation: that regulation was too burdensome
on small business and requirements were incomprehensible to the average American. As he phrased it:
I have often said that the American people are sick and tired of excessive
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(1988). See also, Procedures for Implementing the Requirements of the Council on Environmental Quality on the National Environmental

Policy Act, 40 C.F.R. § 6.100-6.1007 (1991).
32. See Daniel A. Dreyfus & Helen M. Ingram, The NationalEnvironmental Policy
Act- A View of Intent and Practice,16 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 243, 248-56 (1976).
33. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Does NEPA Matter?-An Analysis of the Historical
Development and Contemporary Significance of the National Environmental
Policy Act, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 557 (1984).
34. See, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Stryckers Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen,
444 U.S. 223 (1980).
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Federal regulation.... As a farmer and small businessman, and later as a
Governor, I shared this resentment and frustration. I resented the cost of
Government redtape, the interference it represented in my business and personal life, and not least of all, having to deal with the bureaucratic gobbledygook itself.3 5

The Act requires approval of the Office of Management and
Budget 36 (OMB) before any agency can adopt new forms, questionnaires, reporting requirements, or recordkeeping requirements.3 7
Any proposal for new forms or other paperwork requirements must
be submitted in advance to OMB along with an explanation of the extent to which the agency has attempted to use other existing sources
of information within the federal government to obtain this information, an explanation of the extent to which the proposal attempts to
reduce the burden on those who must supply information, and a plan
for tabulating the information in a way that makes it useful to other
agencies and the public.38
Submissions to OMB must also be accompanied by publication of
information regarding the submission in the Federal Register.3 9 OMB
may give the agency and other interested parties an opportunity to be
heard or to submit statements in writing on the proposed new forms
or informational requirements. 40 The agency may not implement its
proposal unless it is approved by OMB.41 However, an independent
regulatory agency may, by majority vote of its members, override
OMB's disapproval.42
V. THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT
The Regulatory Flexibility Act, also enacted by Congress during
the Carter Administration, was an attempt to require administrative
agencies to give greater attention to the disproportionate impact of
their proposed rules on small businesses, small non-profit organiza35. Improving Government Regulations,Statement on Exec. Order No. 12,044, PUB.
PAPERs 561, 561 (Mar. 23, 1978).
36. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB is to be delegated the
authority within OMB to administer the Act. 44 U.S.C. § 3503 (1988).
37. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3502(4), 3507 (1988). See generally,William F. Funk, The Paperwork
Reduction Actk PaperworkReduction Meets Administrative Law, 24 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 1 (1987). The Act does not apply to rules requiring disclosure of information to third parties rather than to the government. Dole v. United Steelworkers
of America, 494 U.S. 26 (1990).
38. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(a)(1988).
39. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(a)(2)(1988).
40. 44 U.S.C. § 3508 (1988).
41. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(a)(3)-(b)(1988).
42. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(c)(1988). As to special issues regarding independent regulatory

agencies, see Harold A. Bruff, "On the ConstitutionalStatus of the Administrative Agencies," 36 AM. U. L. REv. 491 (1987).

1178

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1169

tions, and small governmental jurisdictions.43 Congress appeared to
be motivated by two rather differing notions. First was the notion
that small entities often do not create the type of problem at which
the regulatory statute was directed. 44 Second was the notion that even
where small entities do raise the same type of problems as large ones,
the disproportionate cost of compliance in relation to the resources of
the regulated entity calls for different treatment of the small entity.4 5
When proposing a rule, the Act requires that the agency also prepare and make available for public comment an "initial regulatory
flexibility analysis." This analysis, or a summary of it, is to be published in the Federal Register along with the proposed rule. Also a
copy is to be transmitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
Small Business Administration.46
The initial regulatory flexibility analysis is to contain the reasons
for the proposed rule; a statement of the objectives and legal basis for
the rule; a description, and where feasible, an estimate of the number
of small entities that will be affected by the rule; a description of the
reporting and recordkeeping requirements and the type of professional skills that will be needed to comply with them; and an identification of any existing federal rules that duplicate, overlap or conflict
with the proposed rule. The analysis is also to contain a description of
any significant alternatives to the proposed rule, including differing or
simplified reporting or compliance requirements for small entities, the
use of performance rather than design standards, and possible exemptions for small entities.47
When a final rule is adopted, it is to be accompanied by an "final
regulatory flexibility analysis" which summarizes the comments that
were received in response to the initial analysis and the agency's assessment and response to those, including any changes made in the
43. See generally Paul R. Verkuil, A CriticalGuide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act,
1982 DuKE L.J. 213.
44. Among the Congressional findings and declarations in Section 2 of the Act was
the following: "[L]aws and regulations designed for application to large scale entities have been applied uniformly to small [entities] . . . even though the
problems that gave rise to government action may not have been caused by those
smaller entities." Pub. L. 96-354, § 2(a)(2), 94 Stat. 1165, reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 601 (West Supp. 1992).
45. Among the Congressional findings and declarations in Section 2 of the Act were
the following: "[U]niform Federal regulatory and reporting requirements have in
numerous instances imposed unnecessary and disproportionately burdensome demands including legal, accounting and consulting costs upon small [entities] ...
with limited resources" and "the failure to recognize differences in scale and resources of regulated entities has in numerous instances adversely affected competition in the marketplace, discouraged innovation and restricted improvements in
productivity." Pub. L. 96-354, §§ 2(a)(3) - (4), 94 Stat. 1165 reprintedin 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 601 (West Supp. 1992).
46. 5 U.S.C. § 603(a)(1988).
47. Id. § 603(b)-(c).
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proposed rule as a result of such comments. Also the final analysis is
to describe each of the significant alternatives that was considered to
minimize the economic impact of the rule on small entities, and the
reasons why each was rejected. This final analysis is to be made available to the public. At the time the final rule is published in the Federal Register, a description of how the public may obtain copies of the
final regulatory flexibility analysis is to be included.48
VI.

GENERAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND EXECUTIVE
ORDER 12291

With the end of the Carter administration and the beginning of the
Reagan administration, concern over regulatory reform did not diminish. President Reagan continued and strengthened49 the policy of
White House review of agency rulemaking begun by his predecessors
by issuing Executive Order 12291. It requires each agency to prepare,
and to the extent permitted by law,5 0 to consider a Regulatory Impact
Analysis in connection with every major rule proposal.51
The goal of such analysis is to assure that "regulatory action [will]
not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society."5 2 The analysis is to describe both the potential benefits and costs of the proposed rule
including both beneficial and adverse effects "that cannot be quantified in monetary terms." From this, the agency is to determine the
potential net benefits of the rule, including those that cannot be quantified in monetary terms, and is to discuss other alternatives which
could achieve the same regulatory goal at lower cost, but which the
agency is not legally authorized to adopt.5 3
A regulatory impact analysis is to be transmitted to the Office of
Management and Budget at least sixty days before publishing a proposed rule for comment, and at least thirty days before promulgating a
final rule. A proposed rule is not to be published until OMIB's review
is completed. The agency's notice of proposed rulemaking is to contain a brief summary of the agency's preliminary Regulatory Impact
Analysis, and the full Analysis (both preliminary and final) must be
available to the public.54 No final rule is to be promulgated either un48. Id § 604.
49. See EADS & Fix, supra note 13 at 108-12.
50. See Alfred S. Neely, Statutory Inhibitions to the Application of Principles of

Cost/Benefit Analysis in Administrative Decision Making, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 489
(1985).
51. Executive Order 12,291, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. (West

Supp. 1992).
52. I& § 2(b).
53. Id § 3(d).
54. Id. § 3(g)-(h).
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til OMB's review of the final regulatory impact analysis is completed
and the agency has responded to OMB's views and incorporated those
views in the rulemaking file. 55
One of the great virtues of Executive Order 12291 was its apparent
neutrality. It articulated seemingly unobjectionable principles such
as, "[a]dministrative decisions shall be based on adequate information
concerning the need for and consequences of proposed government action," and "[r]egulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net
benefits to society."56 However, both in design and in application, the
executive order operated in the area of social regulation primarily to
create regulatory relief for business. 57 Under President Reagan's
Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief5s and under President
Bush's Council on Competitiveness 59 the authority was given to direct
the Office of Management and Budget to designate as a "major rule,"
i.e. one subject to cost-benefit analysis requirements, any rule that an
agency has not so designated, and authority to direct OMB to require
agencies to evaluate additional information, waive provisions of the
Executive Order, and require interagency consultation to eliminate
duplication, overlap or conflict in rules. Authority was also given to
direct OMB to promulgate uniform standards for identification of major rules and uniform rules for the development of Regulatory Impact
Analyses, to prepare legislative proposals in consultation with agencies, and monitor agency compliance with the executive order.60
It has become unfashionable to speak of "values" in analyzing public policy choices made by regulatory agencies.6 1 As economists have
increasingly wrested control from lawyers, cost-benefit analysis has
been touted as not only a preferred, but as a value-neutral mode of
analysis. But economic analysis is subject to its own version of
Gresham's law: hard data drives out soft data. This is especially so
55. Id- § 3(f).
56. 1& §2.
57. This is emphasized by the fact that barely four weeks before issuing Executive
Order 12291, President Reagan announced the establishment of a Presidential
Task Force on Regulatory Relief, to be chaired by the Vice President. The Task
Force was charged with making recommendations that would "cut away the
thicket of irrational and senseless regulation." Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, Remarks Announcing the Establishment of the Task Force, PUB.
PAPERs 30, 30 (Jan. 22, 1981).
58. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 6, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601
(West Supp. 1992).
59. Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Review of Regulatory Issues by
the Council on Competitiveness, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 959 (June 15,
1990).
60. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 6, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601
(West Supp. 1992).
61. But see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 46 (1991)("It is unrealistic to draw a sharp line between
personal preferences and political values ...").
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when it is assumed that certain kinds of costs and benefits are not
subject to quantification. Although complex methods exist to attempt
to assign "shadow values" to intangibles that are not normally the subject of pricing in our economic system, 62 in general cost-benefit analysis under Executive Order 12291 is not that sophisticated. The
Administrative Conference of the United States has recommended
merely that "regulatory analysis documents... [should] describe important decisionmaking variables that are not subject to quantitative
analysis." 63 Therefore, cost-benefit analysis is likely to create a kind
of false precision and lead policy makers to assume that economic efficiency as measured by quantifiable data is all that counts.64 The difficulties in quantifying other humanistic values 65 inevitably leads to
such values being ignored. 66
The imprecision in cost-benefit analysis stems in large part from
uncertainty regarding the value to be attached to the benefits of regulation.67 Economic value changes as society's perception of the importance of a particular benefit changes and as wealth distributions
change. 68 Regulatory reforms of recent years have often been attempts to assure that regulators will give greater weight to new or
changing societal concerns.
VII. FAMILY POLICYMAKING CRITERIA IN
ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING
Just as prior presidents were concerned with specific policy goals,
not just general balancing of costs and benefits, so was the Reagan
62. See MARK SAGOFF, THE EcoNOMy OF THE EARTH 14, 74-92 (1988).
63. 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-2(4)(b)(1992).
64. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis andRegulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L.
REv. 1243, 1289-90 (1987).
65. See EADs & Fix, supra note 13, at 14:
As far as economists are concerned, the problems of environmental pollution, excessive levels of workplace hazards, or unsafe consumer products exist largely because "commodities" like environmental quality,
workplace safety, and product safety do not trade in markets. Economists work hard to devise ways to simulate markets for such
commodities...."
66. Cf. Gumo CALABRESI, IDEALS, BEIEFs, ATrusS, AND THE LAW 69-86
(1985)(failure to compensate for certain kinds of injuries leads society to become
accustomed and callous to such injuries). For the position that attempts to simulate markets for such items is inappropriate because the values being pursued
should not be seen as economic in nature, see SAGOFF, supra note 62.
67. It is possible to define cost-benefit analysis in theory to take into account "any
relevant attitude, opinion, argument, or belief that a person might conceivably be
willing to back up with money. When analysts expand the notion of an externality in this way..., they make a bald attempt not to inform but to replace the
political process ..
" SAGOFF, supra note 62, at 37.
68. Changes in wealth shift the demand curve. See Daniel Farber, Environmentalism, Economics, and the PublicInterest, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (1989).
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administration. However, different value judgments took centerstage. Thus, despite the seemingly all-encompassing requirements of
Executive Order 12291, President Reagan additionally issued a series
of executive orders focusing on specific, difficult-to-quantify, concerns.
Few rallying cries were more persistent and more vague during the
Reagan presidency than that of "family values." In 1987, President
Reagan issued Executive Order 12606 in order to "ensure that the autonomy and rights of the family are considered in the formulation and
implementation of policies by Executive departments and agencies." 69
The Order first set out certain questions to be asked by each agency
"[i]n formulating and implementing policies and regulations that may
have significant impact on family formation, maintenance, and general
well being." Most of these are questions which do not readily lend
themselves to quantitative cost-benefit analysis. Were it otherwise, already mandated Regulatory Impact Analyses would adequately factor
them into rulemaking.
The family value questions, as set out in the Executive Order are:
(a) Does this action by government strengthen or erode the stability of the
family and, particularly, the marital commitment?
(b) Does this action strengthen or erode the authority and rights of parents in
the education, nurture, and supervision of their children?

(c) Does this action help the family perform its functions or does it substitute
governmental activity for the function?
(d) Does this action by government increase or decrease family earnings? Do

the proposed benefits of this action justify the impact on the family budget?
(e)Can this activity be carried out by a lower level of government or by the
family itself?
(f) What message, intended or otherwise, does this program send to the public

concerning the status of the family?
(g) What message does it send to young people concerning the relationship
between their behavior, their personal responsibility, and the norms of our

society?

70

As with other similar executive orders, an implementation
mechanism was created which essentially centralizes enforcement of
the Executive Order in the Office of Management and Budget. The
Executive Order first requires each department or agency to identify
every proposed regulation (as well as proposed legislation) that may
have "significant potential negative impact on the family well-being." 71 The agency or department must provide an adequate explanation of why the proposal is being made. Also, the agency or
department head must certify in writing to the Office of Management
and Budget that, to the extent permitted by law, the proposal has been
subjected to the questions set out in the Executive Order and must
69. Exec. Order No. 12,606, 3 C.F.R. 241 (1988) reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West
Supp. 1992).
70. Id
71. Id.
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certify how the proposal will enhance family well-being.72
VIII.

FEDERALISM CONCERNS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
RULEMAKING

Executive Order 12612, also issued in 1987, was intended to restore
the original intent of the framers of the Constitution regarding federal-state relationships to rulemaking by administrative agencies. 73
This was, of course, a tall order given the changed role of the federal
government that led to the modem administrative state. Nevertheless, the Executive Order provides that Executive departments and
agencies are to be guided by specific federalism principles in formulating and implementing policies.
These principles articulated by the Executive Order embody very
traditional notions of federalism:
(a) Federalism is rooted in the knowledge that our political liberties are best
assured by limiting the size and scope of national government.
(b) The people of the States created the national government when they delegated to it those enumerated governmental powers relating to matters beyond
the competence of the individual States. All other sovereign powers, save
those expressly prohibited the States by the Constitution, are reserved to the
States or to the people.
(c) The constitutional relationship among sovereign governments, State and
national, is formalized in and protected by the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution.
(d) The people of the States are free, subject only to restrictions in the Constitution itself or in constitutionally authorized Acts of Congress, to define the
moral, political, and legal character of their lives.
(e) In most areas of governmental concern, the States uniquely possess the
constitutional authority, the resources, and the competence to discern the sentiments of the people and to govern accordingly. In Thomas Jefferson's
words, the States are 'the most competent administrations for our domestic
concerns and the surest bulwarks against antirepublican tendencies.'
(f) The nature of our constitutional system encourages a healthy diversity in
the public policies adopted by the people of the several States according to
their own conditions, needs, and desires. In the search for enlightened public
policy, individual States and communities are free to experiment with a variety of approaches to public issues.
(g) Acts of the national government-whether legislative, executive, or judicial in nature-that exceed the enumerated powers of that government under
the Constitution violate the principle of federalism established by the
Framers.
(h) Policies of the national government should recognize the responsibility
of-and should encourage opportunities for-individuals, families, neighborhoods, local governments, and private associations to achieve their personal,
social, and economic objectives through cooperative effort.
Ci) In the absence of clear constitutional or statutory authority, the presumption of sovereignty should rest with the individual States. Uncertainties re72. Id.
73. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West
Supp. 1992).
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garding the legitimate authority of the national government should be
resolved against regulation at the national level. 7 4

The Executive Order focuses primarily on federal action that limits
the policymaking discretion of the states, providing that such federal
action is justified only when the problem is of national scope. It distinguishes national problems from those that are merely "common to" all
the states. 75 Further, it limits federal action to situations in which
constitutional authority for the federal action is "clear and certain."
This is defined as situations in which authority may be found in a specific constitutional provision, no constitutional provision prohibits
such action, and it does not encroach on authority reserved to the
states. 76 This formulation appears significantly narrower than the
usual scope of federal power articulated through the "necessary and
proper" clause of the Constitution. 77
Where federal action is called for, the Executive Order discourages
nationally uniform policies. It encourages programs in which each
state develops its own policies to achieve federal program objectives,
or at least in which states have maximum administrative discretion
and have input into formulation of the federal standards.T8 It also provides that administrative agencies should not construe federal statutes
as pre-empting state law, or as authorizing pre-emption of state law by
rulemaking, unless the federal statute expressly provides for pre-emption "or there is some other firm and palpable evidence compelling the
79
conclusion" that Congress intended pre-emption.
Each agency is to appoint an official who is responsible for implementation of the Executive Order. Where proposals have sufficient
federalism implications, the agency must include a Federalism Assessment as part of its cost-benefit analysis submitted to the Office of
Management and Budget under Executive Order 12291. This Assessment is to identify any portions of the proposal that are inconsistent
with the federalism principles enunciated in the Executive Order, the
extent to which the proposal imposes additional costs or burdens on
state, the likely source of funding for the states, states' ability to fulfill
the purposes of the proposal, and the extent to which the proposal
would affect states' ability to discharge traditional functions of state
government or other aspects of state sovereignty.80
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
IdId
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW 300-05 (2d ed.
1988).
78. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West
Supp. 1992).
79. Id.
80. Id
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PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS-AVOIDING
REGULATORY TAKINGS

Executive Order 12630,81 issued after two major U.S. Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the scope of the Fifth Amendment's taking clause,82 was designed to limit the extent to which administrative
agency regulations might inadvertently impose obligations on the federal government to compensate landowners. The Executive Order reflects a very broad view of those actions which might constitute a
regulatory taking. Not only is physical invasion or occupancy of property covered, but so is any regulation that would substantially affect
the value or use of property, even though less than a complete
deprivation.83
Like other Executive Orders mandating particular value-laden
considerations, an official with responsibility for complying with the
executive order is to be appointed and an impact analysis is required.
The Executive Order provides that before imposing health or safety
regulations on private property, the administrative agency in internal
deliberative documents, in notices of proposed rulemaking, and in any
required submissions to the Office of Management and Budget must
focus on certain Fifth Amendment considerations. The agency must
identify clearly and specifically the public health or safety risk being
addressed; determine that the proposed regulation is substantially related to protecting against that risk and that any restrictions on use of
private property are not disproportionate to the risk created by that
use; and estimate the potential cost to the government in the event
that compensation for the taking is required.8 4 The Attorney General
was mandated to draft further Guidelines to implement the Executive
Order.85
X. CONTROL OF AGENDA SETTING-REGULATORY
FLEXIBILITY AGENDA, EXECUTIVE ORDER 12498
AND THE NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
ACT OF 1990
The greatest impact on rulemaking occurs when relevant view81. Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1989), reprintedin 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West
Supp. 1992). See generally, Pollot, The Effect of the Federal Takings Executive
Order,May 1979 LAND USE LAW 3.
82. Nollan v. California Coastal Community, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). For a
more recent decision on regulatory takings, see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
83. Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1989), reprintedin 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West
Supp. 1992).

84. I85. Id
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points are injected early in the process. By the time that public comment is sought under the Administrative Procedure Act, many
alternatives have already been eliminated.86 Some of the regulatory
reforms of recent years have been aimed at gaining access at an earlier
stage for groups with certain types of interest in a rulemaking
proposal.
As part of the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, Congress required that twice a year each agency must publish in the Federal Register a so-called "regulatory flexibility agenda." The "agenda" is to
include a description of the subject of, objectives of, and legal basis for
any rules likely to impact small entities which the agency expects to

propose; a schedule for action on the rule; and the name and telephone
number of an agency official who may be contacted regarding the proposal. This agenda is also to be transmitted to the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration, and to small entities
or their representatives through direct notification or publication.8 7
Executive Order 12498, issued by President Reagan in 1985, extended the concept of the Regulatory Flexibility Agenda to all proposed rulemaking and again centralized control in the Office of
Management and Budget.88 Each agency is required to submit to the
Office of Management and Budget an annual statement of its regulatory policies, goals and objectives, and information on all pending or
planned regulatory actions. OMB is to review this information to determine whether the agency's proposals are consistent with Administration policies and priorities and is to identify further action that may
be necessary to achieve such consistency. Further review may take
place at the Cabinet or Presidential level. After the review process is
completed, the agency is to submit its final regulatory plan which will
be incorporated as part of the Administration's Regulatory Program
for the year. If an agency later proposes to take a regulatory action
that is materially different from that described in its final regulatory
program, it must first submit it for review by OVIB. Otherwise, except
in unusual circumstances such as new legal requirements or unanticipated emergencies, 01B will return for reconsideration any non-conforming proposal submitted later under Executive Order 12291.
A more elaborate procedure which agencies are permitted, but not
required, to use was established by the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of
1990.89 Where there are a limited number of identifiable interests that
will be significantly affected, the agency may create a committee with
balanced representation of those interests to negotiate to reach a con86. See McGarity supra note 64, at 1260.
87. 5 U.S.C. § 602 (1981).
88. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West
Supp. 1992).
89. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 581-590 (West Supp. 1992).
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sensus on a rule that will be proposed for comment under the Administrative Procedure Act.90 The Negotiated Rulemaking Act sets out
procedures for notice regarding the proposed committee and for applications or nominations for membership by those who believe that
their interests will not otherwise be adequately represented. 91
XI.

REGULATORY MORATORIUM AND THE
COMPETITIVENESS COUNCIL

The politicization of regulatory reform reached its height during
the administration of George Bush. In his January 1992 State of the
Union Message, President Bush announced:
I have, this evening, asked major Cabinet departments and Federal agencies to institute a 90-day moratorium on any new Federal regulations that
could hinder growth. In those 90 days, major departments and agencies will
carry out a top-to-bottom review of all regulations, old and new, to stop
the
92
ones that will hurt growth and speed up those that will help growth.

This moratorium, which was extended for another 120 days upon its

initial expiration, 93 and then was extended until the end of George
Bush's term as president, 9 4 is in a sense the ultimate admission of frustration and defeat. 9 5 The long series of prior regulatory mandates had
not accomplished their purposes. According to Vice President Quayle,
90. 5 U.S.C.A. § 583 (West Supp. 1992).
91. 5 U.S.C.A. § 584 (West Supp. 1992).
92. President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc, 170, 172 (Jan. 28, 1992).
93. President's Remarks on Regulatory Reform, 28 WEEKLY CoMp. PREs. Doc. 726,
727 (April 29, 1992).
94. The final extension of the moratorium was announced by President Bush in his
acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention, Remarks Accepting
the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Houston,
28 WEEKLY COMiP. PREs. Doc. 1462,1466 (August 24, 1992). On August 31, 1992, a
White House spokeswoman stated that the announcement at the convention had
functionally extended the moratorium, even though no formal Presidential memorandum had yet been issued. Government Operations, Regulatory Moratorium
Remains in Effect Despite Lack of Official Bush Memorandum, Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA)(Sept. 1, 1992). On November 20, 1992, Vice President Quayle
issued a memorandum to all department and agency heads stating that agencies
"should continue to follow the procedures and substantive standards established
by the president" in his original regulatory moratorium. Quayle Sends Memo
Reminding Agencies to Comply With Regulatory Moratorium, Washington Insider (BNA)(Dec. 7, 1992).
In an interview just prior to his election, then-candidate Bill Clinton stated
that while he did not agree with every recommendation of the Competitiveness
Council, he would employ "some sort of" presidential review process rather than
abdicating regulatory policy to the agencies. Regulatory Policy: Bush Touts
Freeze; Clinton Would Keep, Modify Controls, Daily Rep. for Executives
(BNA)(Oct. 29, 1992).
95. See Victor, Tale of the Red Tape, 24 NAT'L J. 684 (1992) quoting economist Pat
Choate: "What is sad but amusing is to hear this president and his Cabinet officers, as a regular part of their speeches, lament the management of the federal
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cost-benefit review by the Office of Management and Budget had become lax under the Reagan administration.96 A reversal of regulatory
inertia to reflect values of the executive branch could be accomplished
only through a new centralization of power, now lodged in the Competitiveness Council chaired by the Vice President.
The moratorium was imposed so that each agency could identify
regulations and programs that impose substantial costs on the economy, and could decide whether those were justified in light of a group
of criteria similar to those already found in President Reagan's original executive order mandating cost-benefit analysis and those found in
the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The specific criteria are:
(a)The expected benefits to society of any regulation should clearly outweigh the expected costs it imposes on society;
(b) Regulations should be fashioned to maximize net benefits to society;
(c)To the maximum extent possible, regulatory agencies should set performance standards instead of prescriptive, command-and-control requirements, thereby allowing the regulated community to achieve regulatory goals
at the lowest possible cost;
(d)Regulations should incorporate market mechanisms to the maximum
extent possible;
(e)Regulations should provide clarity and certainty to the
regulated com97
munity and should be designed to avoid needless litigation.

During this moratorium period, not only are agencies to conduct a
review of existing rules, but they are to refrain from issuing any new
rule proposals or adopting any new final rules unless the agency determines, after consultation with a special working group of the Council
on Competitiveness co-chaired by the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and the Counsel to the President, that the new rules
will foster economic growth or that they are essential to criminal law
enforcement. The only exceptions to this pre-screening by the Competitiveness Council are regulations that are subject to a statutory or
judicial deadline that falls during the moratorium regulations that respond to emergencies such as imminent danger to human health or
safety, military or foreign affairs regulations, regulations related
solely to agency organization, management or personnel, and formal
regulations required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.9 8
The role of the Competitiveness Council has made this moratorium
particularly controversial. The Council was originally established by
President Bush in 1989 to review regdlatory issues and other matters
government when, by this point, every single top person from a GS-14 on was
hired and appointed by them."
96. Government Operations: Quayle to Recommend Continuing "War" on Regulations After Moratorium Ends, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA)(April 3, 1992).
97. President's Memorandum on Reducing the Burden of Government Regulation,
28 WEEKLY COMp. PREs.Doc. 232, 233 (Jan. 28, 1992).
98. Id at 233-34.
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that bear on the competitiveness of the United States economy. 99 A
year later, the President designated the Council as the appropriate
body to review issues raised in connection with the regulatory program under Executive Order 12498 and directed it to exercise the
same authority over regulatory issues as did the Presidential Task
Force on Regulatory Relief under Executive order 12291.100 This
meant, among other things, that the Competitiveness Council was to
review each agency's annual draft regulatory program to determine its
consistency with administration policies.'o' However, the Council became most controversial because of its informal and non-public intrusion into agency rulemaking decisions.o2 Seen as a method for
business interests to bypass the normal rulemaking processes, 0 3 the
House of Representatives in July 1992 voted to cut off funding for the
0
Competitiveness Council. 0 4 However, the Senate restored funding 5
06
and prevailed in the Conference Committee.
As a final compromise, though, a manager's statement drafted in the Conference Committee requested that all activities of the Competitiveness Council be
made available for public review.'0 7
XII. WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW?
When rulemaking is governed by the rule of law, judicial review of
rulemaking procedures operates to ensure that agencies comply with
the mandates of law that have been previously established. However,
so long as procedural requirements have been met, substantive
rulemaking determinations will be overturned generally only if they
99. White House Briefing by Marlin Fitzwater, April 4, 1989, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Fed News File.
100. Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Review of Regulatory Issues by
the Council on Competitiveness, 26 WEEKLY Comp. PRES. Doc. 959 (June 15,
1990).
101. Exec. Order No., 12,498, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 323, (1986) reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601
(West Supp. 1992).
102. See Bob Woodward & David Broder, Quayle's Quest-Curb Rules, Leave "No Fingerprints",WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1992, at Al.
103. See Tim Beardsley, Executive Fix: Is the Competitiveness Council Overstepping
Its Bounds; White House Council on Competitiveness, SCI. AM., March 1992 at
104.
104. Susan Kellam, House Goes After Fundingfor Executive Branch, 50 CONG. Q. 1937
(1992).
105. Susan Kellam, Social Security Riders Thrown From Senate Treasury Bill, 50
CONG. Q. 2712, 2713 (1992).
106. Susan Kellam, Conferees Cut $200 Million, Pave Way to Approval, 50 CONG. Q.
2936 (1992).
107. Susan Kellam, Government Funding Bill Moves Through House, 50 CONG. Q.
3040 (1992). Clinton transition officials have indicated that the Competiveness
Council is likely to be eliminated by the Clinton administration. Berke, The New
Presidency: The White House Staff; Advisers Looking Askance at Pledgefor 25%5
Staff Cut, N.Y. TImEs, Jan. 7, 1993, p. A-18.
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are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law."OS In essence, agency rulemaking is subject to
reversal by the courts only if the agency acted unreasonably. 109 This
minimal review of substantive results emphasizes the importance
of
the identity of the governmental agency which exercises judgment in
originating and choosing among rulemaking alternatives.
A hallmark of the new regulatory reform, however, has been the
extent to which it is shielded from judicial review even of procedural
requirements. Those reforms which have been instituted by executive
order have routinely provided:
This Order is intended to improve the internal management of the Executive branch and is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person. 1 1 0

Courts have generally accepted at face value this preclusion of judicial
review.1 11
Those reforms that have been instituted by statute have similar
provisions to preclude review. The Paperwork Reduction Act includes a provision that "[t]here shall be no judicial review of any kind
of the Director's decision to approve or not to act upon a collection of
information requirement contained in an agency rule."'1 12 The Regulatory Flexibility Act provides that an agency's regulatory flexibility
analysis and its compliance or noncompliance with the Act are not
subject to judicial review. However, when an action for judicial review
of a rule is instituted, any regulatory flexibility analysis for the rule
will constitute part of the whole record of agency action in connection
with the review."13 Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the courts
have held that while compliance with the Act is not reviewable, the
content of the analysis may be considered in determining whether the
rule is reasonable. In the absence of an analysis prepared by the
agency, similar issues may be raised by public comment, and the failure to adequately respond to public comment may be the basis for ju108. 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(West Supp. 1992).
109. See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAw § 10.15 (2d ed. 1984).
110. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 6, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601
(West Supp. 1992); Exec. Order No. 12,498, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5
U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp. 1992); Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1988);
reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp. 1992); Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R.
554 (1989), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp. 1992). See generally, Peter
Raven-Hansen, Making Agencies Follow Orders:JudicialReview of Agency Violationsof Executive Order 12,291, 1983 DuKE L. J. 285.
111. Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 187 (6th Cir. 1986); Louisiana ex rel Guste v.
Verity, 681 F.Supp. 1178,1181-82 (E.D. La. 1988), aff'd 850 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1988),
cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 783 (1989).
112. 44 U.S.C. § 3504(h)(9)(1988).
113. 5 U.S.C.A. § 611 (West Supp. 1992).
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dicial review.1' 4
This limited review of administrative rules, and of the transfer of
control from specific agencies to the White House highlights the political nature of the new administrative reforms. Within a broad range
of reasonable alternatives, agency action will stand.
XIII.

WHY SO MUCH REFORM?

Why has there been such an oversupply of regulatory reform? At
least four interrelated explanations can be advanced. First, new societal concerns have arisen which were not considered by the drafters of
original regulatory statutes. The original statutes mandated certain
goals without taking account of these new considerations. The environmental concerns embodied in the National Environmental Policy
Act are a prime example. Here action is clearly needed to obtain a
proper weighing of these new concerns. However, whether an acrossthe-board approach permits a sufficient integration of new values into
existing legislative mandates is open to serious question.
A second generator of regulatory reform during the Reagan and
Bush administrations was divided government, i.e. the control of Congress by a different political party than controls the White House. 1 5
In this posture, the Executive Branch with different priorities and policies is often unable to obtain amendment or repeal of regulatory provisions. Therefore, it attempts to use other means to shape the output
of government agencies.
Third, regulatory reform is impelled by the differences in perspective of regulators and the White House. Regulatory agencies are rightfully advocates for the mandate that has been given to them. Whether
the mandate is workplace safety, drug safety, or environmental protection, the agency's outlook is narrower, and more committed to a
cause, than is the President's. In particular, the President is often intensely concerned with issues of economic prosperity. It is natural for
regulation to appear to be an impediment to growth. By its nature,
regulation adds cost. Immediate expenditures required of identifiable
businesses, often exaggerated in amount by those subject to regulation, appear overly significant when balanced against future potential
injuries to unknown victims. It is for this reason that an agency or
department was given the institutional role of advocate for regulatory
implementation. When that role is subject to control by the White
House, an anti-regulation bias is inevitably injected.
114. Colorado ex rel Colorado State Banking Bd. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 926 F.2d
931, 947-48 (10th Cir. 1991); Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 187-88 (6th Cir.
1986); Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 404-08 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Small Refiner
Lead Phasedown Task Force v. Gorsuch, 705 F.2d 506, 537-39 (1983).
115. See James L. Sundquist, A Government Divided Against Itself, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., June 24, 1992, p. B1.
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Finally, the new regulatory reform can be seen as a product of
political hypocrisy. Politicians are able to advocate social reform in
general terms, but block it in specific cases through impact analyses.
The White House is able to enunciate policies, such as family values or
federalism, or property rights in general terms, without concern about
the problems of embodying them in specific instances.
The non-partisan civil service-a descriptive term seldom heard today in governmental circles-has become the whipping boy for the inability of elected officials to reach a consensus on deep issues of policy
and values. "Bureaucrats" become easy targets of presidents and legislators who have assigned conflicting and difficult roles to administrative agencies. Only political leadership that reaches a consensus on
the major policy confrontations of our day promises to reduce the continual outpouring of half-hearted and insincere administrative reform.
XIV.

IS THE PROBLEM ONLY ONE OF SECRECY?

Much of the criticism of regulatory reform has focused upon the
secrecy of the input from OMB or the Council on Competitiveness in
the development of rules.16 Some have suggested that all communications from these agencies be made part of the public record.117 One
proposed bill introduced into Congress would have required a public
record of all significant communications between White House review
bodies and rule-making administrative agencies. 1 8 But is disclosure
enough? It is generally agreed that changing the locus of decisionmaking can have a significant impact on results. Since courts are severely limited in their review of the substance of agency rules, mere
disclosure that a particular focus was the result of comments from
other parts of the executive branch may not be a sufficient safeguard.
Critical to the protection of health, safety, or environmental concerns is the fact that a particular agency and its staff have developed
both an expertise in and support for the mission of the agency. Early
portions of the rule-development process have been recognized as critical. When particular options are ruled in or ruled out at an early
stage, it is difficult for changes to be made at a late point.119 Just as
the agenda setter has significant control at the legislative level, 120 so
the early participants in the rulemaking process effectively act as
agenda setters.
OMB or the Council on Competitiveness should be limited to making disclosed written input, and this should be permitted only during
116. See, e.g., Woodward & Broder, supra note 102.
117. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 29, at 1072.
118. See Holly Idelson, Glenn Trying to Shed Light on Rule-Making Process,49 CONG.
Q. 3449 (1991); see also text at note 107, supra.
119. McGarity, supra note 64, at 1255-56.
120. See Mueller, supra note 1, at 88-89.
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the same period that it is permitted to the public. This does not mean
that White House influence on administrative rulemaking would disappear. It merely means that the rule drafting process will not be
skewed to give White House views undue influence in the regulatory
process. Also, the traditionally accepted influence of the White House
through the appointment of personnel and the budgetary process,
among others, will still furnish ample opportunity for a president to
influence agency action in ways that do not undermine the traditional
rule of law that is so critical for the administrative process.12 1
XV. CONCLUSION
Americans generally prefer to substitute procedures for the difficulties of substantive value choices. Until this tendency is overcome,
little change can be expected. Value choices are neither easy nor popular. But they are critical to reestablishment of a rule of law in administrative rulemaking.

121. See, RICHARD PIERCE, SIDNEY SHAPIRo & PAUL VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PRoCESS 86-115 (1985).

